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The recent debt restructuring in Greece, which imposed 
up-front losses of about $130 billion on bondholders 
(mainly European banks), and all-in losses of more than 70 
percent on a net-present-value (NPV) basis, is actually the 
third time in the last decade that a sovereign workout (1) 
has been driven largely by political considerations and (2) 
has led to an erosion of international creditor rights and 
the rule of law.  
The road to perdition for investors starts out in Buenos 
Aires (in default since 2002), winds its way through Quito 
(2008–2009), and has now reached Athens in 2012. Time 
will tell where it will be extended next—most likely, within 
Europe. The lesson is that while government bonds are 
usually low-risk investments, especially relative to 
corporate bonds and complex structured securities, on 
occasion these obligations are perverted or ignored by 
governments lacking in ability or willingness to pay. Each 
of these rare instances sets a troubling precedent worthy 
of reflection. 
The Argentina Precedent 
The government of Argentina announced in late December 
2001 that it would be defaulting on its public debt, and a 
couple of months later it abandoned its fixed exchange-
rate regime (where one peso was equal to one U.S. dollar), 
allowing its currency to devalue massively. In the three 
and a half years prior to the default, the country had been 
undergoing deflation (or an “internal devaluation”) 
comparable to that which Greece is now experiencing: 
Argentina’s real GDP dropped 15.7 percent from 2Q98 to 
4Q01. The economy would go on to fall an additional 4.5 
percent in the wake of the default and devaluation, for a 
GDP collapse of nearly 20 percent between mid-1998 and 
mid-2002. The urban unemployment rate increased more 
than 8 percentage points during that period, from 13.2 
percent to 21.5 percent of the labor force. However, 
Argentina’s economy would soon bounce back courtesy of 
booming commodity prices and an export-led recovery, 
with GDP returning to its 2Q98 level by 1Q05 and the 
unemployment rate falling back down below 13 percent 
even quicker than that.
1
  
                                                             
1
 Seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP data from the Dirección 
Nacional de Cuentas Nacionales, INDEC, and unemployment rates 
from the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, INDEC. Real GDP 
Main Points 
• Three sovereign defaults in the past decade 
have each inflicted losses of at least 70 percent 
on bondholders—Argentina, Ecuador, and now 
Greece. 
• In each case, creditor rights and the rule of law 
were trampled, setting troubling precedents 
that are worrying investors involved in 
vulnerable European countries. 
• In Argentina (in default since 2002), numerous 
arbitrary measures were taken that damaged 
the interests of investors; the debt relief that 
was demanded bore little relation to the 
country’s capacity to pay; and court judgments 
and arbitral awards against the sovereign have 
been routinely ignored. 
• Ecuador (2008–2009) stands as the clearest 
example of sovereign unwillingness to pay. 
Investors were blindsided, bullied, and then 
sacrificed as part of a personal and ideological 
vendetta on President Correa’s part. 
• Investor confidence in Greece was destroyed by 
persistently negative attitudes coming out of 
Berlin. The huge losses imposed on creditors 
were based on questionable estimates and 
judgments, and various troubling, expedient 
means were used to achieve the dubious ends. 
2 
As to the Greek economy, it has already shrunk by about 
20 percent since peaking in mid-2008, and even the IMF is 
projecting that it will contract by almost 6 percent more 
between this year and next. The unemployment rate has 
soared by nearly 14 percentage points already, from 7.2 
percent in mid-2008 to 20.7 percent in 4Q11.
2
 This 
relatively deeper downward spiral in Greece than in 
Argentina is consistent with the insights of economic 
theory and the findings of empirical studies, namely, that 
in the absence of any exchange-rate flexibility, all 
necessary economic adjustments have a more pronounced 
effect on output and employment than would be the case 
otherwise. The grave problem lies in the way the default 
on some $90 billion in obligations to bondholders and 
other creditors was handled in Argentina—back in 2002 
and through today.  
First, a number of arbitrary measures were taken just 
before and right after the default and devaluation that 
complicated the resolution of the country’s crisis. Bank 
deposits were frozen; capital controls were imposed; the 
application of bankruptcy and foreclosure laws was 
suspended; selective price controls were enacted; 
contracts allowing for utility price increases in the event of 
currency devaluation were broken; and dollar-
denominated assets and liabilities were forcibly converted 
into pesos at different exchange rates to the benefit of 
debtors—including the government—and the detriment of 
banks, depositors, and ultimately taxpayers.
3
 
These initial measures have been modified through the 
years, but they offered a preview of what has become a 
decade of heightened government nationalism, 
interventionism, and paternalism—populist policies that 
would make the late General Juan Perón proud, but that 
are tenable only as long as Argentina continues to benefit 
from high prices for its commodity exports. 
Second, while other sovereigns in financial trouble—
including Argentina itself in the past—sought to avoid a 
default, all post-2001 administrations in Buenos Aires have 
been uncooperative and indeed defiant in their approach 
to creditors.  It took them three years to put forth a 
unilateral, take-it-or-leave-it offer to restart payments to 
bondholders, and when they did (in early 2005) it was 
contingent on creditors accepting massive losses, 
                                                                                                          
nowadays stands more than 60 percent higher than it did back in 
2Q98, and the unemployment rate has stabilized below 7.5 percent. 
2
 Non-seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP and unemployment data 
from the Hellenic Statistical Authority; IMF GDP projections from 
“Greece: Preliminary Debt Sustainability Analysis,” February 15, 
2012, table 2. 
3
 IMF, “Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina,” October 8, 2003. 
estimated at more than 70 percent on a net-present-value 
(NPV) basis.
4
 Coincidence or relevant precedent, it 
happens to be the same degree of punishment just 
delivered by Greece to its own bondholders, as mentioned 
at the outset. 
Adding insult to injury, Argentina refused to recognize 
most of the interest arrears that its own delay had 
generated, not to speak of treating the arrears 
preferentially; failed to include an upfront payment to 
clear a portion of the arrears, a common “sweetener” to 
ensure success; was not accompanied by the usual 
reassuring endorsement—never mind financial support—
from the IMF or other multilateral agencies; and did not 
aim for universal acceptance in order to bring the default 
episode to a conclusion. To intimidate its creditors into 
submission, the government had the legislature pass a law 
forbidding any future reopening of the debt exchange as 
well as any potential payment to holdouts even if arising 
from a court order (the “Lock Law”).
5
 
Third, the enormous debt forgiveness Argentina 
demanded bore no relation to the country’s enhanced—
and fast-improving—capacity to pay. While the 
government’s debt burden in relation to GDP had soared 
from 54 percent in 2001 to nearly 170 percent in 2002 in 
the wake of the ballooning of Argentina’s foreign-currency 
debt post-devaluation, it had already dropped below 130 
percent by 2004 and was headed to double digits on its 
own. Given an intervening boom in government tax 
revenues and a recovery in official international reserves 
to above $20 billion, Argentina’s demand for such massive 
debt relief was unjustified. Previously, such extent of debt 
forgiveness had been granted by bank creditors only to 
desperately poor countries like Niger in 1991, Bolivia in 
1992, Albania in 1995, Guyana in 1999, and Yemen in 
2001.
6
   
As a result, the 2005 debt restructuring attracted a mere 
76 percent of bondholders, the lowest participation rate 
by far compared to other sovereign workouts. While many 
investors decided to pass on this restructuring in the hope 
of a better offer from Argentina in the future, others 
headed to courthouses in New York and various venues in 
Europe, obtaining dozens of court judgments in their favor 
                                                             
4
 Juan J. Cruces and Christoph Trebesch, “Sovereign Defaults: The 
Price of Haircuts,” CESIFO Working Paper #3604, October 2011, p. 
30. The authors summarize various alternative calculations of 
investor NPV losses generated by them and other experts, and they 
average 74 percent. 
5
 Arturo C. Porzecanski, “From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: 
Implications of Argentina’s Default,” Chicago Journal of International 
Law, Summer 2005. 
6
 Ibid. 
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involving billions of dollars in claims for principal and past-
due interest.  
At the same time, a number of multinational companies 
headed mainly to the International Center for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the world’s premier 
dispute-resolution center (and part of the World Bank 
Group), to file claims against Argentina for breach of 
contract, taking advantage of the protections offered by 
various bilateral investment treaties. At present, there are 
25 cases against Argentina winding their way through the 
ICSID arbitration process, and 24 cases have been 
concluded—the most claims ever filed against a single 
country.   
The government’s attitude toward both court judgments 
and arbitral awards against it remains one of contempt: as 
far as is known, no payments have been made, even after 
routine appeals, annulment procedures, and stays of 
enforcement have run their course.
7
 
In early 2010, the government reopened its 2005 debt 
exchange and a number of holdout bondholders 
capitulated, accepting the steep losses and new long-term 
bonds offered by Argentina.
8
 The authorities did so 
despite the fact that the country’s economic 
circumstances were vastly improved, with the debt-to-GDP 
ratio down to around 50 percent and official international 
reserves up to a high of more than $50 billion.  
By now, about 92 percent of bondholders have tendered 
their old, defaulted bonds, either in 2005 or in 2010. But 
the remainder, who are owed more than $15 billion 
(including  accrued and penalty  interest),  now constitute 
a hard core of unpaid creditors. They are pursuing every 
remedy legally available to enforce their claims. That is 
why Argentina has been unable to return to the 
international bond markets: there are creditors waiting to 
block any such issuance until they are paid what the courts 
have agreed they are owed. 
Argentina has also not cured its decade-long default on 
debts to the Paris Club of official bilateral lenders (export 
credit and foreign aid agencies), who are owed close to $8 
billion, of which about $7 billion is in arrears. The 
Argentine authorities have repeatedly stated their 
intention to negotiate with the Paris Club and to reach a 
                                                             
7
 For background on ICSID proceedings involving Argentina, see Eric 
David Kasenetz, “Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures: The 
Aftermath of Argentina’s State of Necessity and the Current Fight in 
the ICSID,” George Washington International Law Review 3 (2010). 
8
 The supposedly ironclad “Lock Law” was temporarily suspended by 
an act of the Argentine legislature to permit a reopening of the 2005 
debt exchange. 
rescheduling agreement. But they have balked at the 
requirement that the IMF pass judgment on the 
justification for any debt relief, so much so, that Buenos 
Aires has shut its doors to the Fund, refusing to abide by 
its treaty obligations which include allowing the IMF to 
inspect its books and evaluate the country’s economic 
performance and policies under a so-called Article IV 
consultation.  
The IMF is supposed to hold bilateral discussions with its 
member governments annually, but Argentina has not 
hosted the IMF since 2006.  Moreover, the IMF has 
repeatedly questioned the veracity of official inflation and 
GDP statistics published by the Argentine government, as 
have numerous private-sector economists inside and 
outside the country. Member governments are obligated 
to furnish reliable data to the IMF under Article VIII, 
Section 5, of its Articles of Agreement.
9
 
In sum, the case of Argentina sets a number of troubling 
precedents in terms of how a sovereign in temporary 
financial difficulties ought to behave in order to obtain 
needed debt relief. One would have to recall the 1930s 
before finding another country that lost its way in the 
international capital markets for as long as has 
Argentina—a cautionary tale of the downside of 
mistreating investors. 
The Ecuador Precedent 
In mid-November 2008, the government of Ecuador made 
it known that an upcoming coupon payment on a 
sovereign bond maturing in 2012 would not be made on 
time, and a formal default on the country’s foreign debt 
was declared (on December 12) before the 30-day grace 
period was up. Soon after, it was announced that an 
upcoming interest payment on another sovereign bond, 
this one due in 2015, would likewise not be made. 
President Rafael Correa would justify the country’s 
moratorium on the basis that Ecuador’s foreign debt 
obligations were “immoral,” “illegal,” “illegitimate,” or all 
of the above. 
Yet as the weeks and months passed, it became apparent 
that Ecuador’s default would be highly selective, and that 
it would lead neither to a repudiation of obligations nor to 
a negotiated or even unilateral debt exchange (Argentine-
style) for the purpose of obtaining massive debt 
forgiveness. The default was confined to two of the 
country’s sovereign bonds: the one maturing in 2012 and 
                                                             
9
 See “Argentina’s Inflation Problem: The Price of Cooking the 
Books,” The Economist, February 25, 2012, and for additional 
background Arturo C. Porzecanski, “Should Argentina be Welcomed 
Back by Investors?,” World Economics, September–December 2011. 
4 
another due in 2030, both of which accounted for nearly 
one-third of the external public debt as of end-2008. The 
other two-thirds of the foreign debt were spared. Indeed, 
in mid-January 2009, the government surprisingly decided 
to pay the coupon on the 2015 bond just before its grace 
period ran out, saying that its nature was different—
evidently, it was moral, legal, and/or legitimate when 
compared to the other two bonds. 
The 2012 and 2030 bonds were themselves born out of an 
earlier sovereign default that took place in August 1999. In 
July of 2000, Ecuador had issued them in exchange for 
existing obligations to which major reductions in principal 
or interest payments were applied, such that the resulting 
debt relief entailed an average NPV (net present value) 
loss to creditors on the order of 34 percent.
10
 Some 97 
percent of all bondholders accepted that exchange offer, 
giving Ecuador substantial debt forgiveness as well as 
significant cash-flow relief in the initial years. The 2015 
bond, in contrast, was the product of a voluntary market 
transaction that took place at the end of 2005. 
The way the Correa administration dealt with the two 
“questionable” sovereign bonds was to buy them back 
from investors, indirectly at first and then directly, paying 
cash for a fraction of their face value (or rather, their pre-
default market value), for the purpose of extinguishing 
them. The government reportedly began to purchase the 
2012 bonds in the secondary market after their price 
collapsed following the mid-November 2008 decision to 
default on them, using an Ecuadorian bank as the front 
man. It allegedly continued repurchasing its securities 
after defaulting on the 2030 bond, such that by one 
estimate, the government picked up as much as half of the 
two bond issues in this backhanded manner.
11
 
Then, on April 20, 2009, the government announced a 
buyback offer to repurchase the remaining bonds in 
private hands through a modified Dutch auction with a 
base price of 30 cents on the dollar. A disclosure 
document circulated at the time set an expiration date of 
May 15 for all offers, and it made plain that Ecuador had 
no intention of resuming payments on the two bonds after 
that date. In the event, 91 percent of the bonds 
outstanding were tendered, including those in government 
hands, and an additional 4 percent were handed in after 
an extension was granted, enabling the government to 
                                                             
10
 Cruces and Trebesch, “Sovereign Defaults,” p. 30, average of 
various alternative calculations. 
11
 This and the following paragraphs borrow heavily from Arturo C. 
Porzecanski, “When Bad Things Happen to Good Sovereign Debt 
Contracts: The Case of Ecuador,” Law & Contemporary Problems, 
Fall 2010. 
retire nearly $3 billion in bonds for around $900 million in 
cash payments. The resulting hit to investors was an 
average NPV loss on the order of 68 percent.
12
 
Ecuador’s 2008–2009 default was a clear case of 
unwillingness to pay. At no point before or after the 
default did the government assert that servicing the two 
bonds posed a financial hardship. There was no objective 
basis for doing so: in 2008, the public external debt was 
the least burdensome it had been in over three decades, 
relative to government revenues or to GDP (less than 20 
percent, down from 70 percent of GDP in 2000). 
Moreover, the country’s central bank held more freely 
disposable international reserves ($6.5 billion) than it had 
ever accumulated before.
13
  
Fifteen months after the default, the finance minister 
would herself confirm that it had not been prompted by 
any economic difficulties.
14
 Two renowned attorneys 
wrote, “It was the first time in modern history that a 
sovereign debtor had demanded that its external 
commercial creditors write off most of their claims . . . 
without advancing a plausible argument that financial 
distress warranted such extraordinary debt relief.”
15
 
The motivation for the default was an alleged ideological 
and personal vendetta by President Correa. In 2003, 
Correa had been retained by the government as an 
economic adviser on the issue of how to set up and pay for 
a universal health-care system in Ecuador. At the time, 
funding for social programs was limited because oil export 
prices were low (around $25/barrel), and oil-related 
revenues that might otherwise be available were being 
deposited into a government fund to generate the savings 
necessary to redeem the 2012 and 2030 sovereign bonds.  
When Correa was appointed finance minister in 2005, he 
wasted no time in proposing to the legislature the 
abolition of the fund and the setting up of an alternate 
one to underwrite largely social spending—an initiative 
that prospered. And then, at his inaugural address as 
president in January 2007, Correa announced that his 
administration would engage in a “firm and sovereign 
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 Cruces and Trebesch, “Sovereign Defaults,” p. 30, average of two 
alternative calculations. 
13
 Even though Ecuador’s revenues and GDP dropped somewhat in 
2009 in the aftermath of the global recession, the burden of interest 
payments on the 2012 and 2030 bonds (a mere 1.9 percent of 2008 
government revenues and 0.6 percent of 2008 GDP) would not have 
risen appreciably in the absence of a default. 
14
 See Ministerio de Finanzas del Ecuador, “La Moratoria de los 
Global 2012 y 2030 Fue por Ilegitimidad y No por Falta de Recursos,” 
Press Release #007, March 4, 2010. 
15
 Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, “The Coroner’s Inquest,” 
International Financial Law Review, September 2008. 
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renegotiation of the external debt, above all of the 
inadmissible conditions that were imposed on us in the 
debt exchange of 2000.”
16
 
President Correa soon appointed a commission to carry 
out an audit of the domestic and foreign public debt 
chaired by his first finance minister, Ricardo Patiño, plus 
others from his administration and a number of civil-
society representatives with a long history of militancy in 
the debt-forgiveness or debt-repudiation movements. 
Patiño would later have to resign from this cabinet post 
and the commission because of a scandal involving the 
alleged manipulation of Ecuador’s bonded debt—an omen 
of what would follow.
17
  
The commission’s report appeared to be written in haste, 
without the benefit of having hired professional auditors, 
interviewing past finance ministry officials or former 
presidents, or gaining access to many important 
documents. It concluded that much of Ecuador’s debt was 
tainted by illegality and illegitimacy, and involved 
instances of profiteering, excessive conditionality, lack of 
transparency, abuse of authority, and multiple other 
irregularities. 
The debt audit commission apportioned blame to foreign 
commercial and investment banks, official bilateral and 
multilateral lenders, the U.S. Federal Reserve (for “illegally 
raising interest rates”), former government officials, the 
country’s own central bank, foreign and domestic legal 
counsel, and so on. Interestingly, Ecuador’s three 
outstanding sovereign bonds were all denounced 
equally.
18
  
President Correa received the commission’s final report in 
November 2008, but by then he had already ordered that 
payment on the next coupon of the 2012 bonds be 
skipped. He embraced the report publicly to justify the 
default, yet he went on to cherry-pick from its conclusions 
and, as pointed out earlier, decided to keep on servicing 
two-thirds of the public foreign debt—plus all of the 
government’s domestic obligations—penalizing only the 
bondholders he had meant to target all along.  
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 Presidencia de la República del Ecuador, “Discurso de Posesión del 
Presidente de la República, Econ. Rafael Correa,” January 15, 2007. 
17
 “Ecuador: Caught on Camera,” The Economist, July 26, 2007. 
Patiño has remained in Correa’s cabinet as minister of foreign 
affairs. 
18
 Internal Auditing Commission for Public Credit of Ecuador, Final 
Report: Executive Summary, November 2008. The proceeds of the 
2015 bond issue had been devoted by a prior administration to 
repurchase a portion of the 2012 bonds, in accordance with a 
commitment made at the time of the 2000 debt exchange. Because 
of this, the 2015 bond could have been regarded by President 
Correa as guilty by association. 
He never appealed to the “odious-debt” doctrine (that 
national debt incurred by governments that do not serve 
the interests of the people are not enforceable) or any 
other grounds for repudiation—and with good reason, 
because Ecuador has been under continuous civilian, 
constitutional rule since mid-1979, and virtually all of the 
build-up in foreign public indebtedness had taken place 
subsequently.
19
 Issues of state succession, war-related 
debts, widespread corruption, the absence of informed 
consent, or collusion on the part of creditors to divert 
funds for contrary purposes—none of these potentially 
relevant criteria for an odious debt argument were 
applicable, and Correa evidently realized it. Indeed, the 
irony is that his government ended up spending a tidy sum 
buying back supposedly immoral, illegal, and/or 
illegitimate obligations —and in so doing, validated them.  
Ecuador’s 2008–2009 default and bond-market 
manipulations mocked creditor rights and the rule of law. 
By taking a variety of deliberate actions to depress the 
value of their bonds and then repurchasing them at rock-
bottom prices, the authorities in Quito became the 
principal beneficiary of their own default. The government 
concealed at the time, and has yet to reveal, the extent of 
its true beneficial ownership of the sovereign bonds 
tendered into the May 2009 buyback auction. That 
frustrated the protections in the trust indenture that 
governed the two securities, because they specified that 
bonds owned or controlled by Ecuador should not have 
counted for the purpose of any collective action.
20
 
The impression conveyed by authorities was that 
Ecuador’s bondholders were participants in a “voluntary” 
restructuring process, when in fact they were the likely 
victims of an elaborate deception. A veteran financial 
reporter commented at the time that since the 
bondholders had no say whatsoever in the destruction of 
the value of their investments, their only “choice” was 
whether to accept Ecuador’s offer or hold onto defaulted 
Ecuadorian paper indefinitely.
21
 This was the dilemma that 
investors faced particularly after having witnessed how 
Argentina had managed to frustrate attempts to be held 
accountable for its default in the foreign courts of law and 
arbitration tribunals that had jurisdiction. 
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 The greatest build-up in foreign public indebtedness took place 
from 1980 through 1994, when the sum total of Ecuador’s 
obligations (including arrears) skyrocketed from less than $3 billion 
to nearly $14 billion, tripling even in relation to rising government 
revenues and GDP. 
20
 Buchheit and Gulati, “The Coroner’s Inquest.” 
21
 Felix Salmon, “Is the Obama Administration Condoning Ecuador’s 
Default?,” Reuters, May 18, 2009. 
6 
In sum, Ecuador’s case set a number of additional 
precedents, the most important being that sovereign 
unwillingness, and not just inability, to pay contracted 
amounts can be the source of a default—despite the 
protections contained in elaborate bond indentures—and 
that sovereigns can engage in market manipulation and 
behave in unprincipled ways without fear of prosecution. 
Notwithstanding the best of legal contracts and the usual 
surrender of sovereign immunities under foreign laws, in 
actual practice, rogue debtors can be held accountable or 
effectively restrained only by the forceful actions of other 
sovereigns. If the government of Ecuador has faced any 
penalty for its misbehavior in 2008–2009, it is that it has 
not been welcomed back to the international capital 
markets, but so far President Correa has not minded, 
preferring to rely instead on loans mainly from China.
22
 
The Greek Tragedy, Act I 
The pedestrian narrative about the Greek financial crisis 
and default is that the country was fiscally mismanaged for 
a long time and failed to carry out needed structural 
reforms that could have improved economic growth 
prospects and enhanced the country’s creditworthiness. 
Therefore, a default and debt restructuring were 
inevitable sooner or later—and certainly so once the 
financial markets were informed, as happened in October 
2009, that prior governments had underestimated their 
budget deficit and public debt figures. The prosaic tale of 
the supposed inevitability of the Greek tragedy has been 
endorsed, for example, by a prominent economic 
historian: “Since independence in the 1830s, Greece has 
been in a state of default about 50 percent of the time. 
Does that tell you something?”
23
 
In reality, Greece’s road to default and debt restructuring 
in 2012 was not at all straightforward—and there was no 
historical inevitability about it, either. Consider some of 
the facts. In the last five decades, successive governments 
in Greece managed their public finances without a hitch, 
including servicing a very high level of public debt that 
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 Many of the loans are backed by or related to crude oil exports to 
China, and “[f]or Ecuador and Venezuela, the large influx of Chinese 
lending has served as a key source of foreign finance” that has 
compensated for lack of access to the international bond market. 
See Kevin P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, and Katherine Koleski, The New 
Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America, Inter-American 
Dialogue, March 2012, pp. 7–8. 
23
 “Q&A: Carmen Reinhart on Greece, U.S. Debt and Other ‘Scary 
Scenarios,’” Wall Street Journal Blogs, February 5, 2010. This is 
reminiscent of skeptical attitudes among academics toward 
Mexico’s financial crises at the end of seemingly every six-year 
presidential term—at least until a dozen years ago, that is, when 
Mexico “outgrew” them. 
averaged the equivalent of nearly 100 percent of GDP 
from 1990 until 2009.
24
 In 2009, the public debt was 
structured very favorably: the average interest rate on the 
debt was a low 4.2 percent, and its weighted-average 
residual maturity was 8 years, the second-longest among 
advanced economies (after the United Kingdom)—despite 
the eurozone’s no-bailout pledge.
25
 
It is true that Greece raised eyebrows in October 2009, 
when an incoming government announced that the fiscal 
deficit for 2008 had been revised from the equivalent of 5 
percent to 7.7 percent of GDP, and that because of an 
election-related drop in tax revenues and a splurge in fiscal 
spending, the deficit for 2009 would end up closer to 12.5 
rather than 3.7 percent of GDP. (In the event, the actual 
figures were 6.5 percent and 15.8 percent of GDP, 
respectively.) It is also the case that the incoming prime 
minister promised at the time to impose austerity 
measures, but that he was short of convincing detail and 
political support. 
However, Greece was the rule rather than the exception: 
every one of the 17 member countries of the eurozone 
experienced a major fiscal deterioration between 2007 
and 2009 as a consequence of Europe’s economic 
downturn. While Greece’s fiscal deficit widened by 9.3 
percentage points of GDP during the two years, the fiscal 
position of the eurozone as a whole widened 5.7 
percentage points. Britain’s own 2009 budget deficit was 
equivalent to 11.3 percent of GDP.
26
 
And largely because of the added fiscal cost of various 
bank bailout plans, the ratio of government debt to GDP 
increased by 13.5 percentage points in the whole of the 
eurozone between 2007 and 2009, and a more limited 5.6 
percentage points in Greece. (In the United Kingdom, 
meanwhile, it jumped by more than 25 percentage points 
of GDP.) Among other heavily indebted countries in the 
eurozone, the ratio of debt to GDP went up as much as 
11.8 percentage points in Belgium and as little as 2.7 
                                                             
24
 IMF, Historical Public Debt Database, September 2011. The 
precise two-decade average was 99 percent of GDP. The 
government of Greece defaulted on its obligations during the Great 
Depression, as did some 30 other governments around the world, 
more than a fifth of total sovereign issuers, and the default was 
finally cured in 1964. See Standard & Poor’s, “Sovereign Defaults at 
26-Year Low, to Show Little Change in 2007,” September 18, 2006. 
25
 Average implicit interest rate calculated by the author from 
Eurostat, Government Finance Statistics, Summary Tables 1996–
2010, December 2011, p. 13; maturity data from IMF, Fiscal Monitor, 
November 2010, pp. 27–32.  
26
 Unless otherwise noted, all fiscal data cited here and appearing in 
the nearby table are the author’s calculations from Eurostat, 
Government Finance Statistics, Summary Tables 1996–2010. 
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percentage points in Italy. The eurozone average debt-to-
GDP ratio as of late 2011 exceeded 87 percent; it had been 
66 percent in 2007.
27
 
The news that the 2009 fiscal deficit in Greece would be 
much larger than previously projected actually did not lead 
to a measurable loss of investor confidence in Greece’s 
ability to refinance its debt and access new funds to cover 
ongoing deficits. Yields on Greek two-year and five-year 
benchmark government bonds were slightly lower in the 
five working days after, than in the five days prior, to the 
October 20 announcement by George Papaconstantinou, 
then finance minister in the new Socialist government, 
that the budget deficit would be far higher than estimates 
provided by the former Conservative administration.
28
 
The erosion of investor confidence that would take place 
later on could have been prevented if Greece’s eurozone 
partners had seized the initiative and worked 
constructively with the new government in Athens to 
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come up with a preemptive plan to introduce fiscal 
austerity and implement structural reforms that was 
backed by Europe and the IMF. After all, the public debt of 
Greece was minuscule by eurozone standards: it 
represented as of end-2009 a mere 3.4 percent of 
eurozone GDP, or 4.2 percent of total eurozone 
government debt. Early on, Greece could have been 
stabilized—and for a fraction of what it has cost so far. 
Instead, initial hesitation in Athens on the part of Prime 
Minister George Papandreou, combined with inertia and 
indecision that gripped the eurozone in assembling a 
stabilization program for Greece until six months later, 
would plant the seed of doubt among the credit-rating 
agencies, market analysts, and investors—and not just 
about Greece’s fate, but also about the vulnerabilities of 
other countries sharing the single European currency. This 
is why a few months after Greece was provided with 
official funding, Portugal and Ireland also had to be 
supported by the EU and the IMF.
29
 In essence, Greece 
unwittingly played the role of the child in Hans Christian 
Anderson’s famous tale, pointing out that the eurozone 
“Emperor” was stark naked.
30
 
The erosion of investor confidence in Greece started in 
December 2009, when all three of the leading rating 
agencies downgraded the sovereign (Fitch and Standard & 
Poor’s from A- to BBB+ and Moody’s from A1 to A2, all 
with a negative outlook). That fanned concerns that Greek 
government bonds would be excluded from ECB 
(European Central Bank) market operations when 
collateral credit-quality rules returned to pre-crisis levels 
at the end of 2010—concerns that were aggravated in 
mid-January when President Jean-Claude Trichet said that 
the bank would not change its collateral policy for the sake 
of “any particular country.”
31
 (In the event, the ECB would 
announce in late March that it was extending its 
emergency collateral rules into 2011, and in May it 
dropped all restrictions on Greek bonds to ensure they did 
not become ineligible after the country was downgraded 
to “junk” level by Standard & Poor’s.) Yields on two-year 
Greek government bonds rose from below 2 percent in 
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early December 2009 to a peak of 6.5 percent in early 
February 2010, before subsiding to around 5.5 percent 
later that month. 
Investor confidence was undermined again in April 2010 
ahead of an agreement between Greece and the IMF, ECB, 
and European Commission (the so-called Troika) on an 
economic stabilization and reform plan backed by a joint 
European Union-IMF financing package worth €110 billion.  
Yields on two-year Greek government bonds increased 
from 4.5 percent in late March to above 18 percent in 
early May before dropping below 7 percent by mid-May, 
on the heels of both the financing package and news that 
the ECB would buy government and private debt in the 
biggest attempt yet to end the European financial crisis. 
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was born, 
the region’s “temporary” bailout mechanism, with an 
initial capital of €440 billion. 
Another investor scare took place in mid-June 2010, when 
Moody’s concurred with Standard & Poor’s move in late 
April and downgraded Greece’s government bond ratings 
to “junk” (to Ba1 from A3), a level “which incorporates a 
greater, albeit, low risk of default.”
32
 Yields on two-year 
Greek government bonds rose from 7.5 percent to 10 
percent prior to easing down to 9.5 percent in early July. 
There followed an additional, temporary loss of investor 
nerve in mid-August, but then the bond market calmed 
down partly owing to praise from the IMF for Greece’s 
continuing effort to rein in its fiscal deficit. Yields on the 
two-year bonds fell to as low as 7.25 percent by mid-
October. 
The Greek Tragedy, Act II 
What turned out to be the destruction of investor 
confidence on a permanent basis began on October 18, 
2010, when German chancellor Merkel and French 
president Sarkozy met in Deauville (France) and agreed 
that private investors must “contribute” to future 
European sovereign bailouts. This would be the price of a 
deal to set up a larger, permanent bailout fund to replace 
the EFSF, because according to Merkel the current system 
of state-funded rescues had allowed for too much “moral 
hazard” to creep into the bond market. 
The financial markets were understandably roiled. In 
Greece, two-year bond yields jumped from 7.25 percent 
back up above 10 percent. On November 4, the ECB’s 
Trichet expressed public concern that forcing bondholders 
to take losses would drive up borrowing costs. On 
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November 12, seeking to calm the financial markets, the 
finance ministers of Europe’s five largest countries issued 
a statement clarifying that any private-sector involvement 
(PSI) would not apply to any outstanding debt, and would 
only come into effect from 2013. However, irreparable 
damage to confidence was done.  
The following March (2011), Moody’s became the first of 
the major rating agencies to slash Greece down to single-B 
status, citing in part “the lack of certainty surrounding the 
precise nature and conditions of support that will be 
available to Greece after 2013, and its implications for 
bondholders.”
33
 It was followed by Standard & Poor’s and 
Fitch two months later, after the top European finance 
ministers gathered in Luxembourg (in May) to discuss 
further aid for Greece—but on condition that it would be 
accompanied by sacrifices made by private creditors. The 
ECB’s Trichet walked out, refusing to participate in any 
meeting that discussed such “haircuts.”
34
  
Later that May, European finance ministers for the first 
time floated the idea of talks with bondholders to extend 
Greece’s debt-repayment schedule. Two weeks later, 
Moody’s downgraded Greece to Caa1, consistent with a 50 
percent probability of default, in part because of the 
likelihood that the Troika would “make the provision of 
financial assistance to Greece over the medium term 
conditional on a debt restructuring, in which private-sector 
creditors would absorb some economic losses.”
35
 
In early June, Berlin proposed extending the maturities on 
Greek bonds by seven years. Within days, Standard & 
Poor’s responded by downgrading Greece to CCC, citing 
that “the risk of default . . . within the next 12 months has 
increased significantly,” and that in the event of a default, 
bondholders would recover only 30–50 percent of what 
they were owed.
36
 For his part, Mario Draghi, the 
incoming president of the ECB, warned during his 
confirmation hearings against forcing private investors to 
take part: “All in all, the costs outweigh the benefits,” he 
said.
37
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As the IMF would admit in a July 2011 report, the very 
public, protracted debate in Europe over this issue would 
take a heavy toll in Greece, not only by propelling bond 
yields ever higher, but by encouraging a flight of bank 
deposits and also, via rating downgrades, to a decrease of 
value on Greek collateral with the ECB, necessitating banks 
to post additional collateral when they could least afford 
it. Bank stress, in turn, was encouraging a major credit 
contraction and aggravating the country’s deepening 
recession.
38
 
Negotiations between Troika officials and some 40 mainly 
European banks represented by the Institute of 
International Finance (IIF) finally reached agreement on a 
bond exchange that would deliver financing to Greece of 
€54 billion from mid-2011 to mid-2014, and a total of €135 
billion from mid-2011 to end-2020. It was a Brady Plan 
vintage 2011, involving the voluntary exchange of 
outstanding Greek bonds for par and discount bonds 
entailing an extension of maturities and either reduced 
coupons or principal forgiveness. Bonds maturing in 2030 
would be fully collateralized and one maturing in 2015 
would be partially collateralized. All instruments were to 
be priced to impose an NPV loss of 21 percent.
39
 Needless 
to say, the rating agencies responded promptly by cutting 
their assessments yet again (Moody’s to Ca, S&P to CC, 
and Fitch to CCC). 
The Greek Tragedy, Act III 
The ink was barely dry on this debt restructuring deal 
when its adequacy began to be questioned. The gloom 
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about the future of the eurozone that became pervasive 
starting in August 2011 caused many officials to revise 
their economic forecasts (including for Greece) in a 
direction that suggested the debt relief on offer would be 
insufficient, the cost of purchasing collateral to back the 
new bonds would be too high, and the voluntary 
participation rate of creditors would prove insufficient.
40
 
This led to a hardening of official attitudes and to an 
October demand that private creditors agree to a new 
plan entailing the forgiveness of at least half of what they 
were owed, with lowered coupons and no collateral 
backing. One of the (circular) arguments put forth was that 
since the prices of Greek bonds had plunged to about 36 
percent of face value from 75 percent since the deal had 
been forged in July, the terms of the original deal were 
now too generous to bondholders.
41
 
There followed several months of negotiations between 
the Troika, Greece, and creditor representatives, but most 
of the time was taken up by various Troika-Greece 
economic and political issues. A confrontation between 
European leaders and Greek prime minister Papandreou 
over his desire to submit the latest austerity and financing 
plan to a national referendum elicited an ultimatum from 
EU leaders (on November 2). Papandreou decided to step 
aside and give way to a new unity government headed by 
Lucas Papademos, a former ECB vice president.  
The negotiations with the creditors resumed in February 
(2012) and a new debt-relief plan was finally agreed on 
February 21, reportedly prompted by the impression 
conveyed to creditor representatives that the eurozone 
leadership might countenance a unilateral default on 
Greece’s part.
42
 Under the terms of the deal, investors 
were “asked” to forgive 53.5 percent of what they were 
owed, and to exchange 31.5 percent of their remaining 
principal for new, low-coupon Greek bonds with maturities 
of 11 to 30 years, and the rest (15 percent) into two-year 
notes issued by the European Financial Stability Facility.
43
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The resulting debt relief is equivalent to about half of 
Greece’s 2011 GDP, and all-in NPV losses to investors were 
estimated to be between 70 and 75 percent, depending on 
the discount rate applied (9–12 percent). The restructuring 
proposal was part and parcel of a €130 billion loan 
program that Europe and the IMF agreed to in return for a 
new round of Greek austerity and reform measures. 
Acceptances were requested by the close of business on 
March 8, and a participation rate of at least 95 percent 
was achieved. 
The debt restructuring was billed as a “voluntary 
transaction” involving private-sector holders of 
approximately €206 billion (face amount) of Greek 
government bonds.
44
 However, it was not to be really 
voluntary in various respects. First, most of the bonds 
were held by Greek banks, or else by dozens of European 
banks and insurers, all of whom operate under the thumb 
of their respective government regulators—and most of 
whom have become dependent for funding on the ECB. 
Realistically, they had no choice but to participate. 
Second, the Greek parliament hastily passed a law 
retroactively introducing “collective action clauses” (CACs) 
into the €177 billion of targeted bonds governed by Greek 
law, specifying that by tendering into the exchange, every 
bondholder was automatically voting to make the terms of 
the exchange applicable to all other bonds.
45
 Therefore, 
once consents from €152 billion of bonds representing 
almost 86 percent of holders were received, the terms of 
the remaining €25 billion were amended as if they too had 
consented. The introduction of CACs in sovereign bonds is 
no novelty, but to our knowledge it has never been done 
retroactively—a clear violation of the “sanctity” of 
contracts. It is no wonder that the new bonds arising from 
the debt exchange are subject to English law; otherwise, 
their indentures would have no credibility. 
Third, the Greek authorities made it plain that 
nonparticipants into the exchange should not expect any 
payments. At a March 5 meeting with investors in 
Frankfurt, the head of Greece’s Public Debt Management 
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Agency stated that the country’s economic program “does 
not contemplate the availability of funds to make 
payments to private sector creditors that decline to 
participate.”
46
 
The message was presumably intended to investors in the 
€29 billion of bonds issued under foreign law or by state-
owned enterprises under government guarantees, whose 
terms could not be amended unilaterally. As of the due 
date, €20 billion (69 percent) of these bonds were 
tendered into the exchange, and some of the rest may yet 
be turned in, since many of them already included CACs 
and the authorities have since extended the deadline to 
April 4. As to any eventual holdouts, litigation in the case 
of Argentina has demonstrated that it is very difficult to 
collect from a sovereign that is unwilling to pay—although 
one would hope that Greece would behave more 
honorably if it came to that.
47
 
It is noteworthy that the €206 billion in government bonds 
subject to debt forgiveness and restructuring account for 
less than 60 percent of the Greek public debt, which 
totaled €356 billion as of end-2011. Treasury bills, which 
the authorities excluded in order not to taint this short-
term segment of the market, represented a mere €15 
billion of that. Loans from the European Union and the 
IMF accounted for €74 billion, and it is understandable 
that these creditors, who are providing new funding, 
would likewise have been excluded. That left some €61 
billion that was potentially up for grabs.
48
 
Most of that figure, however, involved European Central 
Bank holdings of Greek government bonds purchased 
through the Securities Market Program (SMP), the ECB’s 
window to support the secondary market for eurozone 
sovereign bonds. The working assumption among many 
observers had been that the ECB, or possibly individual 
national central banks, would have found a way to 
contribute to Greece’s debt-relief exercise by exchanging 
their existing bonds for new ones paying, for instance, 
lower interest rates.  
As it turned out, in mid-February the ECB did swap its 
stock of Greek government bonds for new ones—but on 
identical terms, just with a separate ISIN (International 
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Securities Identification Number) from that of other Greek 
government bonds. The swap did not include bonds held 
by individual eurozone central banks. What eurozone 
finance ministers have since agreed is that future profits 
made by the ECB from Greek government bonds will be 
distributed alongside other profits to eurozone 
governments, and that they in turn “may be allocated by 
Member States to further improving the sustainability of 
Greece’s public debt.”
49
 
As Standard & Poor’s has pointed out, however, since the 
ECB’s newly minted Greek government bonds were 
exempted from the retroactively applied CACs and were 
thus protected from any forced write-downs, the practical 
effect is that all other bondholders are now effectively 
subordinated to the ECB in terms of payment. “The ECB’s 
swap has established a new precedent by adding another 
class of superior creditor to the existing group comprised 
of the ESM [the upcoming European Stability Mechanism], 
the IMF, and other multilateral development banks. We 
believe that this development could further weaken the 
prospects of peripheral eurozone sovereigns currently 
receiving official funding to regain the ability to access the 
capital markets and could raise borrowing rates of those 
sovereigns still accessing the primary markets.”
50
 
Finally, it should be noted that the extent of debt relief 
required of private creditors was a function of at least two 
judgment calls that can certainly be questioned. The first 
was the decision to recapitalize the Greek banking system 
with EU and IMF funds—and to do so very generously. This 
decision increased the size of the official-sector loan 
package by €50 billion, and thus the extent of losses 
imposed on private creditors—to minimize the burden on 
the government of servicing all the new official debt it is 
taking on. The irony is that a less punishing restructuring 
would have reduced the hit taken by Greek banks, and 
thus the recapitalization bill. 
As the IMF staff report freely admits, “a typical 
recapitalization program would see viable banks 
recapitalized using [Greek] government bonds (with 
perhaps some regulatory forbearance on capital ratios 
while problems are worked out) and the unwinding of 
unviable banks.” In the case of Greece, there was a 
political decision to depart from the customary “owing to 
the need to secure liquidity support from the Eurosystem, 
and to reassure regulators of Greek bank subsidiaries in 
neighboring jurisdictions.”
51
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Moreover, it was decided that all bank deposits would be 
protected and so would all the senior unsecured creditors 
of Greek banks. This is a very expensive way to nurse an 
insolvent banking system back to health, and it has yielded 
a stunning result: those who bought bonds issued by 
Greek banks are faring much better than those who 
bought sovereign bonds—the inverse of the usual 
outcome. 
The second judgment that is highly questionable is the 
decision to extract huge concessions from private creditors 
so that Greece’s debt burden will be at a sustainable level 
(deemed to be 120 percent of GDP) by 2020. The fact is 
that ratios of debt to GDP are not reliable predictors of 
creditworthiness. Moreover, it is easy to make outsized 
mistakes when trying to forecast a ratio of debt to GDP 
during exceptional circumstances, and the IMF staff is 
notorious for its errors in forecasting such ratios and thus 
its failures to predict debt sustainability—or 
unsustainability.
52
 
Recent experience is instructive: in May 2010, the IMF 
staff projected that Greece’s public debt would reach €325 
billion by the end of 2011—a year-and-a-half later—and 
that it would represent 145 percent of 2011 GDP. The 
staff’s latest estimate (as of March 2012) is that the stock 
of debt last year reached €329 billion (a very minor 
deviation from forecast) but that it represented 165 
percent of 2011 GDP—a whopping difference. And the 
reason is a major underestimation of the contraction in 
GDP that has taken place in so short a time, such that 
while the IMF’s forecast for the numerator proved quite 
accurate, that for the denominator was off considerably.
53
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Who is to say that Greece’s GDP cannot bounce back from 
its current bottom, and thus that there cannot be an 
upside surprise a few years from now? 
In sum, the case of Greece has set a number of troubling 
precedents. The country had learned to live—and had 
been allowed to live by its eurozone partners—with a 
relatively high level of public debt. Successive 
governments were able to count on a stable, predictable 
demand for their bonds, at least until investor confidence 
started to erode in late 2009 and early 2010. Greece was 
finally helped by its eurozone partners and the IMF in May 
2010 and was on the mend, when all of a sudden the rug 
was pulled from under it by Chancellor Merkel’s insistence 
(starting October 2010) that private creditors “contribute” 
to future bailouts.  
As the months passed, the intra-European rhetoric 
escalated, rating-agency downgrades multiplied, and the 
specter of default started to loom ever larger. 
Consequently, the demand for Greek government bonds 
evaporated, the banking system went on to lose one-third 
of its deposits, and the economy spiraled into the greatest 
depression in nearly a century. To be sure, Chancellor 
Merkel’s motivations and behavior cannot be compared to 
those of Ecuador’s Correa, but Germany’s very public hard 
line on Greece and its private creditors paved the road for 
an eventual default, and imposed outsized losses on 
investors, that could have been avoided or at least 
minimized. 
Expedient solutions were adopted in an ugly 
demonstration that the ends justify the means. The largest 
sovereign default and greatest creditor losses in history 
were validated by forecasts of debt unsustainability that 
are prone to large error, and arrived at after a 
questionable decision to protect Greek bank creditors and 
depositors all too generously.  
Along the way, private investors were subordinated to the 
ECB and its network of national central banks, a precedent 
that will weigh on investors in other faltering countries. 
The rewriting of local law in Greece with retroactive effect 
cannot be compared to the large-scale violation of 
contracts witnessed in Argentina a decade ago, but is 
troubling nonetheless. More than 97 percent of the 
outstanding bonds of Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Belgium 
are governed by local law,
54
 so these countries could also 
enact legislation similar to Greece’s—and pass on the cost 
of fiscal retrenchment to bondholders, rather than to 
those who actually benefited from government largesse. 
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The road to perdition for investors started out in Buenos 
Aires, wound its way through Quito, and has now reached 
Athens. Time will tell where it will be extended to next—
but chances are that it will be to some other capital in 
Europe. 
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